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problem arising from political divergencies between the states into which the
world was divided, by methods the successful functioning of which presup-
posed an essential unity of purpose among the peoples of the world, and
therefore the absence of political discord. Without having reached the highest
degree of perfection mankind could not hope, through the League, to per-
form the task which this institution was supposed to accomplish."2 But
conditions 'vere changed by the mere formation of this new political insti-
tution, and there is reasonable ground to believe that its operation would, in
the long run, have modified political discord. Furthermore, Mr. Schiffer's
rigid "either-or" approach, which assumes that world organization must be
either a cooperation among the states, or a perfect world state,20 discharging
all state functions on a world scale, ignores the possible development of
entirely new political institutions. Yet, paradoxically, the author chose as
the point of departure of his study the emergence of a new social institution,
the nation-state. "The continuity of life is not the continuity of its institu-
tions .... Organizations are removed from without, they are reformed, or
scrapped and replaced. 27 A few years ago no one conceived of a political
institution such as the European Coal and Steel Community.
Unfortunately, for all its superb scholarship, Mr. Schiffer's study illumi-
nates only one aspect of the development of ideas, calling forth-perhaps
unwittingly--examination of the areas which remain in the dark. In the end
Mr. Schiffer has only confirmed Mannheim's insight that "thinking in terms
of humanity as a whole is no longer chimerical dreaming, but the demand
of the hour." "This vision may still be beyond the reach of many of our
self-styled 'hard-boiled' realists whose 'realism' consists in thinking and act-
ing according to the ideas of a bygone age."
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JuuLus Stone is best known to American readers for his two works in juris-
prudence, Law and Society (in three volumes, with Sidney Post Simpson),
and The Province and Function of Law. The latter is both the most authori-
tative interpretation of the views of Stone's teacher and former colleague at
Harvard Law School, Dean Roscoe Pound, and also perhaps the most detailed
and comprehensive venture in sociological jurisprudence produced to date in
the common law countries.
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Stone's latest work is an attempt to survey public international law from
the wide viewpoint of jurisprudence and legal theory, with particular emphasis
on the techniques and general teachings of the sociological school. It is notable
for the evidence it provides of the range and catholicity of Stone's scholarship.
As might be expected from his joint English and American training, Stone
has canvassed thoroughly English and American source materials; but he seems
to have exhausted also the relevant French and German authorities, he has
dipped deeply into Italian and Spanish literature, and as an extra service he
has given ample attention to the writings of the modern Scandinavian school
of jurisprudence founded by Higerstr6m, who regrettably is still too little
known in the common law countries.
A principal result of Stone's background and training in sociological juris-
prudence is, throughout the present work, his emphasis on the historical rela-
tivism of many of the existing rules of international law. He points to the
Christian, Western European origins of many of the positive law rules, for
example, the conception of international law, widely held up to the close of the
nineteenth century, as the public law of Europe. This approach involves prob-
lems, in the vastly expanded world community of the present era, not merely
in finding a sufficiency of commonly held values and assumptions throughout
the various nation-states to buttress existing positive law rules, but even in
arriving at common verbal symbols of communication between nations. Thus
the doctrine of the "rights of man," Stone suggests, had a fuller common mean-
ing to Frenchmen and Americans in 1780 than it has in 1955-and one may
be pardoned, indeed, for wondering whether the spokesmen of the Western
democratic countries and the Soviet bloc leaders are in the same universe of
discourse in discussing such contemporary United Nations projects as the
draft Declaration of Human Rights. As another aspect of his sociological
approach, Stone is quick to see analogies between the development of inter-
national law rules and the stages of evolution of law within individual nation-
states:
"Just as the English legislature's nineteenth century activity marched with
a conception of municipal law as the command of a Sovereign, so the nine-
teenth century pre-eminence of international treaty-law helped to consoli-
date the theory that international law derives its binding force from the
mere consent of States. The conventional theory of international law,
despite Austin's dissent, matches in function mutatis mutandis the im-
perative theory of municipal law. Both emanate from sovereign entities,
the former being agreed between the subjects, the latter being imposed by
each of them on its respective subjects."'
Again, Stone relates the failure of the high hopes of those who codified the
rules of war at The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 in part to their re-
liance on the classical nineteenth century laissez-faire formula separating eco-
nomics from politics: with the growing role of government in economic life.




sovereigns and their ships, and of the functions and immunities of diplomatic
and consular agents were undermined.
Stone is clearly at his best when in quest of the historical origins of existing
rules of international law and in noting symbiosis between particular positive
law provisions and societal facts of the time and place where those rules were
devised. In this vein he categorically rejects, as inadequate descriptions of the
facts of contemporary international society, the polar positions of present-day
authority on international law which he regards as represented by "the dichot-
omy of Power Politics (leading to perdition) and World Community (living
by the Sermon on the Mount). ''2
This very avoidance of absolutes-an end product of the relativism of values
and institutions that is bound up in the approach of the school of sociological
jurisprudence--does, however, seem to worry Stone at times when he gets into
the main "tension" problems of contemporary international law, and by the
same token to produce some apparent inconsistencies in his basic method for
solution of these problems. Thus, in discussing United Nations intervention
in the Korean war, Stone is critical of Professor McDougal's arguments 3 sup-
porting the legality of the action which was taken by the Security Council in
the absence of a permanent member, the Soviet Union. The legal arguments
marshalled by Professor Stone are detailed and considered, but he then pro-
ceeds, somewhat ingeniously, to reach the same result as Professor McDougal
by classifying the Security Council action as a "recommendation" only and
not a "decision," and therefore not, in terms of the United Nations Charter,
requiring the affirmative votes of permanent members of the Security Council.
Stone's method of approach to this problem is essentially positivist, relying as
he does on close study and analysis of the history of the adoption of relevant
Charter provisions and of past League of Nations and United Nations prac-
tice.4
Again, in discussing the problem of forced repatriation of prisoners-of-war,
which arose in the aftermath of the Korean War, Stone concludes that the
precedents in favor of the captor state's granting asylum to prisoners-of-war
are somewhat inconclusive "in view of the contemporary conditions of ideologi-
cal and political warfare." 5 He then supports his conclusion that such asylum
should not be permitted on purely pragmatic grounds: the danger that captors
less scrupulous than the United Nations would refuse to return prisoners on
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the spurious ground that their own "screening" had found the prisoners afraid
of persecution on their return, and unwilling to be repatriated, and the danger
of interfering with the municipal law of belligerent states relative to treason
and sedition.6
And, in discussing the legal bases of the Nuremburg trials and the effects of
the maxim nulla poena sine lege, Stone seems to rest, ultimately, on a pure
natural law position:
"[T] he ethical import of the maxim is confronted by the countervailing
ethical principles supporting the counts and sentences. Killing, maiming,
torturing and humiliating innocent people are acts condemned by the
value-judgments of all civilised men, and punishable by every civilised
municipal legal system. The calculated instigation of the scourge of war
as an instrument of national policy was also so condemned. All this was
known to the accused when they acted, though they hoped, no doubt, to
be protected by the law of a victorious Nazi State from punishment. If,
then, the rules applied at Nuremberg were not previously rules of positive
international law, they were at least rules of positive ethics accepted by
civilised men everywhere, to which the accused could properly be held
in the form of ethics." 7
The difficulties Stone has in hewing consistently to purely relativist criteria
are not surprising. Stone's great teacher, Roscoe Pound, was exercised by this
same problem though Pound's basic conception of law as a hand-maiden to
society and his consequent awareness of the practical limitations to the effec-
tiveness of the positive law when it seeks to run counter to the main trends
of society caused him to eschew the escape device resorted to by Kohler of,
in effect, authorizing the abandonment by decision-makers of pure social tests
in favor of positive law in the case of "retrogressive civilizations." In ap-
proaching the task of building a more effective contemporary international
law Stone looks with some sympathy on jurists like Judge Alvarez and Pro-
fessor F.S.C. Northrop who, in calling for the reconstruction of international
law on the basis of "the world living law pluralism," are seeking a sort of
international jus gentium that will be more representative in its appeal than the
present essentially Christian, Western European-derived body of doctrine. At
the same time, Stone points out that an approach such as this assumes, rather
than proves, the mutual harmony and even the compatibility of the plurality of
national Weltanschauungen which determine the "living law" and the basic
norms of the several "cultural entities" into which the world is divided. It may
be, indeed, an attempted twentieth century revival of the belief that there is
an innate harmony of free-playing human activities: a similar assumption was
a main drive of nineteenth century libertarian and laissez-faire theories, and
history has scarcely justified the belief in that context. Stone, in the present
treatise, accepting the fact of the present bi-polar political division of the world,





to international law,8 noting the major points of conflict, and yet finding a
substantial number of rules that are generally observed. These rules, though
they are mainly of a utilitarian or instrumental nature, covering matters which
do not engage the major interests or convictions of states, would have to be
accounted for as either adopted independently by each side in the present power
struggle, or as "binding all States independently of their membership in either
camp in a kind of partial ad hoc association."" Stone's program for action in
the absence of what he regards as any present basis for projecting a single
world community with a single legal order, though it is consistent with and
flows inevitably from his sociological major premise, is still a rather Spartan 10
formula to offer the student of international law during the current world
crisis:
"[T] he international lawyer can only do his best to approach traditional
principles and treaty-law as they stand in the books, with a constant
awareness that they may not correspond wholly or at all to 'law in action.'
At the worst, little will be lost by such an approach. At the best, such
activity will preserve, and perhaps develop somewhat, the area of success-
ful universal legal regulation already mentioned, as well as maintain a uni-
versal legal framework, which could, if international conditions changed,
serve for a truly universal community of States.""
EDVARD MCWHINNEY t
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THIs is the fifth volume-although numbered Volume Six--of the second
edition of Professor Moore's treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
originally published in 1938. It covers rules 54 through 60(a), the author
having indicated that material on subdivision (b) of rule 60 will be included
in Volume Seven which is to appear soon. In examining the first edition pub-
lished some sixteen years ago, one finds that rules 54 through 60 consumed
134 pages. Volume Six of the second edition is more than ten times that size.
Professor Moore's reputation in federal practice is firmly established.
Moore's Federal Practice is a treatise without equal in that field. Volume
Six can only serve to enhance the stature of both. It provides a complete.
accurate coverage of all the minutia of the rules included. Yet, at the same
time, it places its central emphasis on the points of real, current controversy
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